IICC Perspectives

The surprise attack of October 7 exposed a deep gap that had developed in recent years between the political, military, and intelligence perceptions of Israel's decision-makers and actual reality. B.G. Brun claims that this gap played a central role in the IDF's inadequate preparedness on the morning of the attack. Since then, it has become clear that, as in other historical surprises, the Israeli intelligence community did in fact possess information that should have indicated not only the existence of this gap but also its magnitude. However, this information, along with additional warning signs that indicated the gap, failed to undermine the flawed perception framework of the decision-makers or prompt them to take more appropriate measures to prevent the attack.

Proffer URI Bar Joseph, a very well known political science analyst, is an expert on security, Military and intelligence issues.
A couple of his books deal with the Egyptian surprise prior to the Yom Kipur war, of October 1973.
In this interesting article, Bar Joseph deals with the threats arising from the interface between populist leaders in liberal democracies, and their intelligence communities, giving the case studies of the USA and Israel.
We all should be worried!

In his article, Dr. Matti Steinberg claims that people who prefer not to see Israel slip into one state with Judea and Samaria, have to support dividing the territory into two states, where the Palestinian state includes the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Saying "no" to one state, means saying a determined "yes" to two states. Thus, there is no escape from a political arrangement for dividing the territory into two states, to ensure the existence of the State of Israel.   Dr. Steinberg taught at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Princeton University and Heidelberg University.

The objective of the following article is to define which aspects of the 'Iron Swords' War should be investigated. Three issues concern us here: first, morality manifested by the obligation to preserve individual dignity in all circumstances, regardless of who the individual is; second, the principles of waging a just war as developed in philosophical thought over many centuries; and third, the standards and principles of the IDF as presented in the document entitled "Spirit of the IDF”, which is the IDF code of ethics.

The Gaza war has demonstrated how female soldiers could, and did, fight courageously in the front lines, alongside male soldiers. It was a forthright response to all those who belittle and oppose, sometimes vehemently, the role of women in combat and their claims for equality. The courageous story of IDF's female soldiers, is told here by Dr. Shulamit (Shuli) Binah.

The war in the Gaza Strip has not ended and it is still too early to draw conclusions, but from its outbreak on October 7, 2023, many people noted the similarity between situations in 1973 and 2023: both were intelligence failures which led to crushing surprise attacks and catastrophic results. Colonel (Ret.) Shlomo Kashi and Brigadier General (Ret.) David Zur will try to shed light and understand the current event, examining similarities and differences, and particularly by looking for common sources for the surprises.

The Israeli Concept of National Security, was formulated in the early 1950s by David Ben-Gurion, who determined its three elements: deterrence, early warning and decision. Substantially, nothing dramatic about it was changed during the last seven centuries, up to these days. This article suggests that the terrible event of October 7 2023, force us to do so, and formulate a new doctrine, based on a new tripod table: defense, offense, and moderation. This really deserve deep thinking, that hopefully will take place soon, at the highest level of decision taking.

The new Quarterly Journal of 'Mabat-Malam' (number 97, November 2023), focuses on the birth of the Israeli Intelligence Community, before, during and after the declaration of independence.
Here, Shulamit Binah tells the story of The Political Department of the Jewish Agency for: Palestine Intelligence and Diplomacy in the Crossroad to Statehood

We all aware to the fact that most of the blame for not having intelligence early warning towards the Yom Kippur war back in 1973, was put on the intelligence community, and particularly on AMAN (IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence).
But, was it only AMAN to be blamed? Dr. Yossi Ben ari thinks differently: In his Ph.D. thesis, he draws light on other elements that were involved, and mainly – on academic experts.
Here is the English abstract of his doctorate work.

"Sorrow and Hope" is a War Memoir written by Shimi Talmi, an NCO case worker who served in Unit 848 (later – 8200) during the Yom Kippur War, back in October 1973. Shimi, a nineteen years old young soldier, was appointed by the Unit Commander, Colonel Yoel Ben Port, to be in touch with the families whose dear ones were taken by Syrian commando soldiers as POWs, during the battle of the Hermon Mountain, on the first day of the war.