IICC Perspectives

The Gaza war has demonstrated how female soldiers could, and did, fight courageously in the front lines, alongside male soldiers. It was a forthright response to all those who belittle and oppose, sometimes vehemently, the role of women in combat and their claims for equality. The courageous story of IDF's female soldiers, is told here by Dr. Shulamit (Shuli) Binah.

The war in the Gaza Strip has not ended and it is still too early to draw conclusions, but from its outbreak on October 7, 2023, many people noted the similarity between situations in 1973 and 2023: both were intelligence failures which led to crushing surprise attacks and catastrophic results. Colonel (Ret.) Shlomo Kashi and Brigadier General (Ret.) David Zur will try to shed light and understand the current event, examining similarities and differences, and particularly by looking for common sources for the surprises.

The Israeli Concept of National Security, was formulated in the early 1950s by David Ben-Gurion, who determined its three elements: deterrence, early warning and decision. Substantially, nothing dramatic about it was changed during the last seven centuries, up to these days. This article suggests that the terrible event of October 7 2023, force us to do so, and formulate a new doctrine, based on a new tripod table: defense, offense, and moderation. This really deserve deep thinking, that hopefully will take place soon, at the highest level of decision taking.

The new Quarterly Journal of 'Mabat-Malam' (number 97, November 2023), focuses on the birth of the Israeli Intelligence Community, before, during and after the declaration of independence.
Here, Shulamit Binah tells the story of The Political Department of the Jewish Agency for: Palestine Intelligence and Diplomacy in the Crossroad to Statehood

We all aware to the fact that most of the blame for not having intelligence early warning towards the Yom Kippur war back in 1973, was put on the intelligence community, and particularly on AMAN (IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence).
But, was it only AMAN to be blamed? Dr. Yossi Ben ari thinks differently: In his Ph.D. thesis, he draws light on other elements that were involved, and mainly – on academic experts.
Here is the English abstract of his doctorate work.

"Sorrow and Hope" is a War Memoir written by Shimi Talmi, an NCO case worker who served in Unit 848 (later – 8200) during the Yom Kippur War, back in October 1973. Shimi, a nineteen years old young soldier, was appointed by the Unit Commander, Colonel Yoel Ben Port, to be in touch with the families whose dear ones were taken by Syrian commando soldiers as POWs, during the battle of the Hermon Mountain, on the first day of the war.

Shabtai Shavit, former director of the Mossad, and head of its operations department in 1973, tells his story of Yom Kippur War, in 50 years of retrospect. He focuses on the critical question of intelligence early warning towards what considers to be, the greatest surprise Israel faced since its establishment, back in 1948.

Alex Mendelson, Father of the late Israel Mendelson, who fell in the battle of Suez in the Yom Kippur War, wrote a letter to his class-mate, Dr. Henry Kissinger, requesting him to help look for his MIA son, while meeting with the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Captain Mendelson served as a military intelligence officer, POWs interrogator.

50 years ago, back in October 1973, Israel faced a truly existential threat, when the Arab Armies launched a surprise attack against our state, which was completely unready to face it.